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ASTRUE V. CAPATO: FORCING A
SHOE THAT DOESN’T FIT
COURTNEY HANNON*
Courts are increasingly encountering dilemmas caused when they must
interpret and apply older laws to matters that have been significantly impacted by
technological advances unimaginable to the lawmakers who wrote the controlling
statutes.1 In Astrue v. Capato ex. rel. B.N.C., et al,.2 the Supreme Court considered
whether a posthumously conceived child qualifies as a ―child‖ for the purpose of
receiving survivors‘ benefits under the Social Security Act.3 The Act was originally
passed in 1935, primarily as a retirement program. 4 In 1939, it was amended
significantly to provide the spouse and dependents of a worker with payments after
the worker retired, and with survivors‘ benefits after the worker died.5
Posthumously conceived children were not a possibility contemplated by the
legislators who enacted the law in its original and amended forms. 6 In Capato, the
Copyright © 2013 by Courtney Hannon.
* JD Candidate, 2014, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law (Baltimore, MD). BA,
Government & Politics, 2011, University of Maryland (College Park, MD). I am incredibly grateful to
the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy editorial board for their tremendous insight and guidance in
developing this article. I would also like to thank my friends and family for their unwavering support.
1. Distinguished Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner has been fairly
outspoken on ―how judges deal with the intersection of science and the law, an increasingly busy and
complex juncture.‖ Ameet Sachdev, Federal Judge Richard Posner Takes on Science and the Law, CHI.
TRIB. (May 11, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-11/business/ct-biz-0511-chicago-law20120511_1_judges-law-clerks-7th-circuit-bar-association. At a bar association dinner, Judge Posner
remarked that, ―[w]hat we‘re confronted with in modern technology is altogether more esoteric and
difficult than what we grew up with,‖ and noted that to deal with this problem, judges ―duck, bluff,
weave and change the subject.‖ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,
371 F.3d 593, 595 (3rd Cir. 2004) (―Developing reproductive technology has outpaced federal and state
laws, which currently do not address directly the legal issues created by posthumous conception.‖).
2. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
3. Id. at 2025–26.
4. Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2013).
5. Id.
6. The first child who was conceived through in vitro fertilization was born in 1978, more than
forty years after the Act‘s passage. See Machelle M. Seibel, A New Era in Reproductive Technology,
318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 828, 828 (1988). Artificial insemination was relatively widely used in the U.S. as
early as the 1950s. Kristine S. Knaplund, Legal Issues of Maternity and Inheritance for the Biotech
Child of the 21st Century, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 393, 395 (2008). However, the technique that
allows the use of a parent‘s gamete or a couple‘s embryo long after the death of one parent,
cryopreservation, was only discovered in 1949, and did not become mainstream until many years later.
See Benjamin Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old Iceblock: How Cryopreservation Has Changed Estate Law,
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Court unanimously held that the intestacy law of the state in which the insured
parent was domiciled at the time of his or her death controlled the answer to the
question which was before the Court.7 If the child could not inherit from the
decedent under the state‘s intestacy law, then the child does not qualify as a ―child‖
for the purposes of survivors‘ benefits.8
Although substantial support exists for the Court‘s holding in Capato—in the
statutory language itself, the legislative intent underlying that language, and the
Court‘s consistency with the Social Security Administrator‘s interpretation of the
Act—the Court was only able to reach its conclusion by glossing over a significant
Equal Protection problem posed by its reading of the survivors‘ benefits
provisions.9 Because the provisions discriminate on the basis of legitimacy, the
Court should have evaluated their validity using intermediate scrutiny, rather than
rational basis review.10 If the Court had properly applied this heightened level of
scrutiny, it likely would have found that survivors‘ benefits provisions are
unconstitutional because the law‘s distinction between nonmarital and marital
children is not substantially related to any important government interest. 11 While
the Court‘s disregard for the Act‘s discrimination against illegitimate children is the
most significant shortcoming of the decision in Capato, the decision is also
inadequate because it promotes continued unpredictability in the legal treatment of
posthumously conceived children.12 To correct these problems, federal and state
legislators both need to take action.13 Congress should replace the Act‘s deference
to state intestacy law with a federal standard for qualifying recipients of survivors‘
benefits more closely related to dependency, and state lawmakers should clearly
and explicitly address posthumous children in their intestacy statutes, possibly
using one of the model laws, such as the 2008 Uniform Probate Code, for
guidance.14
I. THE CASE
Shortly after Karen and Robert Capato were married in New Jersey on May
15, 1999, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal carcinoma.15 The couple decided
to freeze Robert‘s sperm to maintain the possibility of having biological children if

Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and How to Fix It, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL‘Y 347, 355–56 (2011).
7. 132 S. Ct. at 2028.
8. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2028 (2012).
9. See infra notes 178–83 and accompanying text .
10. See infra Part IV.A.1.
11. See infra Part IV.A.2.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See infra Part IV.C.
14. See infra Part IV.C.
15. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Astrue, No. 08–5405 (DMC), 2010 WL 1076522, at *2 (Dist. N.J.
Mar. 23, 2010).
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the chemotherapy rendered Robert infertile. 16 Although the couple naturally
conceived a child, who was born in 2001, they continued to pursue preservation of
Robert‘s sperm because they wanted their child to have a sibling. 17 Robert passed
away in March of 2002, and approximately eighteen months later Karen gave birth
to twins, conceived through artificial insemination treatments using Robert‘s
sperm.18 On October 31, 2003, Karen Capato applied to the Social Security
Administration for child‘s insurance benefits from her deceased husband, Robert
Capato, on behalf of their twin children. 19 When her application was denied,
Capato filed a request for reconsideration, which was also denied.20 Capato then
requested a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge, who ultimately rejected her
claims upon a de novo review.21 After the Appeals Council denied Capato‘s request
for an administrative review, she sued in the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey.22
Affirming the prior denial, the District Court concluded that the
Administrative Law Judge had ―properly evaluated the applicable law,‖ and that his
―decisions were supported by substantial evidence.‖23 The District Court
determined that the Capato twins did not meet the definition of children under
Florida intestacy laws,24 that the Administrative Law Judge was not biased in his
decision, and that denying benefits to the twins did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.25 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit then
reversed, finding that ―the undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner
and his widow‖ qualify for survivors‘ benefits, regardless of what the state
intestacy law says.26 The court reasoned that because Section 416(e) of the Act
broadly defines ―child‖ as including ―the child or legally adopted child of an
individual,‖ there was no need to look to state intestacy law. 27 According to the
Court of Appeals, state law on inheritance rights only becomes relevant when there
is a dispute as to the biological relationship of the applicant and the deceased
insured.28 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the conflict emerging

16. Id. at *1.
17. Id. at *1–*2.
18. Id. at *3.
19. Id. at *1.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at *4.
24. Id. at *6–*7. Although Karen Capato filed this action in the U.S. District for the District of New
Jersey, she and her husband, the deceased insured, resided in Pompano Beach, Florida at the time of the
decedent‘s death. Id. at *3.
25. Id. at *7–*8.
26. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (2011).
27. Id. at 629, 631.
28. Id. at 631.
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among the Circuits over which law applies when determining a posthumously
conceived child‘s eligibility for Social Security survivors‘ benefits. 29
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
A basic understanding of the pertinent Social Security Act provisions is
essential to an informed analysis of the issue in Capato. Section 402(d), ―Child‘s
insurance benefits,‖ states that every ―child‖ of an insured deceased individual is
eligible to receive benefits if the child (1) files an application for benefits, (2) is
under a certain age at the time of application or is under a disability, and (3) was
dependent upon the insured individual at the time of their death. 30 While not listed
as a separate requirement for eligibility, qualifying as a child for the purposes of the
Act‘s benefits provisions is essentially a fourth condition, albeit prerequisite to the
other three.31 ―Child‖ is further defined in Section 416(e) as ―the child or legally
adopted child of an individual.‖32
Although Section 416(h), ―Determination of family status,‖ is not explicitly
referenced in Section 402(d),33 many courts have also found direction in that
provision as to who qualifies as a child when reviewing administrative denials of
survivors‘ benefits to posthumously conceived children. 34 Section 416(h)(2)(A)
provides that the Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter the
―Commissioner‖) should apply the intestacy law of the state where the insured
parent lived when he or she died to determine if an applicant meets the definition of
a child.35 One who does not qualify under the state law will nonetheless be deemed
a child of the insured parent if the applicant is the son or daughter of that person
and if the deceased insured parent and the applicant‘s other parent attempted to be
married, but their marriage was invalidated by some ―legal impediment.‖36 An
applicant who does not fit into either of these two categories may still be deemed a
child of the insured if the insured had acknowledged the child as their son or
daughter, had been declared as the child‘s parent by a court, had been ordered by a
court to support the child as their parent, or is determined by the Commissioner to

29. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012). See infra Part II.B. (describing
the contrasting interpretations of the provisions accepted by the Circuit Courts).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2011).
31. Id.
32. § 416(e).
33. § 402(d)(1) (―Every child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title) . . . .‖).
34. § 416(h). See infra Part II.B (explaining the contrasting approaches that Circuit Courts have
taken as to when § 416(h) applies to the determination of whether a posthumously conceived applicant
qualifies as a ―child‖ under § 402(d)).
35. § 416(h)(2)(A).
36. § 416(h)(2)(B).
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be the child‘s mother or father and to have been living with or contributing support
to the child at the time of the insured‘s death. 37
When the Supreme Court reviewed the Third Circuit‘s decision, the Circuits
were divided between two general views on the issue. 38 Like the Third Circuit, the
Ninth Circuit had reversed a denial of benefits to posthumously conceived
children.39 Finding support in both the Social Security Act and state law, the Ninth
Circuit held that a child who is conceived posthumously, but who is the biological
child of the deceased and his widow, qualifies for survivors‘ benefits because he is
a legitimate child and, as such, is ―deemed dependent on [the insured] for child‘s
insurance benefits.‖40 In contrast, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits had held that one
who is conceived posthumously only qualifies as a child for the purposes of
survivors‘ benefits when that person could inherit intestate from the insured under
the law of the state where was living at the time of death. 41 These courts would
apply such a rule without regard to the marital relationship between the deceased
insured and the child‘s other biological parent. 42
Likewise, state courts have addressed the status of posthumously conceived
children in the interplay of the Social Security Act and intestacy laws using a wide
variety of conflicting approaches. 43 It logically follows from the fact that the
substance of state intestacy laws differ greatly that the application of such statutes
would lead to disparities in the resulting judicial decisions. However, state courts
have interpreted virtually identical language in various state probate laws to have
completely different effects.44 As a result, the adjudication of posthumously
conceived children‘s rights is quite unpredictable and often seems to be based more
on the political and ethical views of the presiding judges than on sound statutory
interpretation.45

37. § 416(h)(3).
38. See infra Part II.B.
39. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 632 (2011); Gillett-Netting v.
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2004).
40. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594. A potential issue with this interpretation of the law is that it
would allow for the differential legal treatment of children based on whether or not their parents were
married, thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause. See infra Part II.D. (discussing how legitimacy
classifications, such as that included in the Social Security Act, may violate the Equal Protection
Clause).
41. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 50–51 (4th
Cir. 2011).
42. See Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 50–51.
43. See infra Part II.C.2.
44. See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 394 (pointing out that the Superior Court of New Jersey in In re
Kolacy, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Finley v. Astrue, interpreted basically the same language
in the pertinent state laws to have completely different practical effects, based on diverging reasoning);
see also infra note 106.
45. See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 392–93 (criticizing the District Court‘s opinion in GillettNetting as particularly ―troubling‖ because, unlike previous courts, which had created their own rule to
address posthumously conceived children when faced with an ambiguous statute, the District Court
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B. Circuit Courts Embrace Opposing Views
1. The Posthumous Biological Child of a Married Couple Always Qualifies
for Survivors’ Benefits
In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
twins conceived after their father‘s death through in vitro fertilization were
―children‖ for the purposes of the Social Security Act, and thus entitled to the
deceased‘s child‘s insurance benefits. 46 The court first acknowledged that ―[n]either
the [Act] nor the Arizona family law . . . makes clear the rights of children
conceived posthumously.‖47 Interpreting this ambiguity, the court determined that
the twins were entitled to benefits because they were the deceased‘s biological,
legitimate children, and thus ―considered to have been dependent under the Act.‖ 48
As such, the court rejected the Commissioner‘s argument that every applicant must
meet the requirements of Sections 416(h)(2) or (3)(C) in order to receive survivors‘
benefits through a deceased insured parent.49 Instead, the Ninth Circuit found that
Section 416(h) simply provides additional ways for a person to qualify as a child
when ―their parents were not married or their parentage was in dispute.‖ 50
However, when an applicant is the legitimate child of a deceased insured, the
person need not meet the criteria set out in Section 416(h) because their legitimacy
serves to satisfy both the child and dependency requirements. 51 Essentially, the
court found that the Act‘s ―[d]etermination of family status‖ provision is irrelevant
when there is no family status to determine.52 And because all legitimate children
are ―deemed dependent‖ on the insured by Section 402(d)(3), they are eligible to
receive benefits, as long as they satisfy the other requirements for eligibility
provided in Section 402(d).53 Under Arizona family law, the Netting children were
the legitimate children of the insured and his widow. 54 The Third Circuit, in
reaching an identical conclusion in Capato, relied on the reasoning used in GillettNetting.55
―strictly construed one section of the statute, ignored one section altogether, and then misstated
another,‖ in order to justify its conclusion, which seemed to have actually been based on ―unexpressed
moral, public policy, or other grounds‖).
46. 371 F.3d 593, 594–95 (9th Cir. 2004).
47. Id. at 595–96.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 596. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text (summarizing the requirements listed
in §§ 416(h)(2) and (3)(C)).
50. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 598. It was uncontested that the Gillett-Netting children had applied for benefits and that
the deceased parent was fully insured at the time of his death. Id. at 596. See supra notes 30–31 and
accompanying text (describing the four requirements for eligibility to receive child‘s insurance benefits).
54. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598.
55. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 629–32 (2011).
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2. A Posthumous Child Qualifies for Survivors’ Benefits Only When the
Child Could Inherit Under the State Intestacy Laws
In Schafer v. Astrue, the Fourth Circuit rejected the surviving parent‘s
argument that the state intestacy rights of legitimate biological children are
irrelevant to their eligibility for survivors‘ benefits because such children clearly
fall within Section 416(e)‘s simple definition of a ―child.‖ 56 Instead the Court
accepted the Social Security Administration‘s interpretation of the Act, reasoning
that Chevron, Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.57 compelled judicial
deference to the agency charged with the challenged statute‘s implementation in
this case.58 The Administration has always read Section 416(h) as elaborating on
the elements necessary to meet the definition of a child briefly described in Section
416(e), which applies to both legitimate and illegitimate applicants alike, and has
administered the Act‘s provision of survivors‘ benefits accordingly. 59 Because the
Court found the agency‘s reading to be reasonable, it was obligated to give effect to
that interpretation.60 However, the Fourth Circuit recognized some merit in the
Schafer alternate understanding of the Act, noting that the ordinary meaning of
―child,‖ as used in the statute, could appear to include all biological children,
regardless of when conceived or born, and that a statute‘s plain language is the best
evidence of the underlying legislative intent. 61 Ultimately though, the Court
decided that the plain language is just one of many factors to consider, and that a
more comprehensive application of all of the rules of statutory interpretation leads
to the conclusion that administrative deference is necessary. 62
In Beeler v. Astrue, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also found the
Administration‘s view to be reasonable and entitled to deference.63 The Court relied
heavily on Schafer to reject arguments that all biological offspring of married
parents qualify as children and to find that Section ―416(h) is thus irrelevant‖ to the
determination of their eligibility for survivors‘ benefits. 64 The Eighth Circuit
concluded that Section 416(h) was not intended just to supplement the qualification
methods in Section 416(e), because the former clearly directs the Administrator to
refer to state intestacy law to decide whether an applicant qualifies as a child ―for

56. 641 F.3d 49, 51 (2011).
57. Chevron established that when Congress has charged an administrative agency with
implementing a statute, the agency‘s interpretation of that statute is entitled to deference as long as it is
reasonable, even if it is not the most reasonable interpretation. 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984).
58. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51 (―The agency‘s view best reflects the statute‘s text, structure, and aim
of providing benefits primarily to those who unexpectedly lose a wage earner‘s support.‖).
59. Id. at 52–53.
60. Id. at 51.
61. Id. at 54.
62. Id.
63. 651 F.3d 954, 956 (2011).
64. Id. at 962–64.
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the purposes of [that] subchapter,‖ which includes Section 416(e).65 Therefore,
every applicant must satisfy one of Section 416(h)‘s criteria in order to qualify as a
―child‖ for the purposes of survivors‘ benefits.66 Among those criteria is the ability
to inherit intestate from the deceased parent under state law. 67
C. State Courts Addressing the Rights of Posthumous Children Have Struggled to
Fit the Children into State Intestacy Laws Not Designed for That Purpose
Several state courts have interpreted their states‘ laws so that they may be
applied in the administration of the Social Security Act, which has had a significant
impact on the inheritance rights of posthumous children. A survey of state intestacy
laws is also helpful for understanding the varied nature of state laws and the import
of the Capato Court‘s deference to those laws.
1. A Survey of State Statutes
While forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have statutes that
expressly address the rights of a child who was conceived before a parent‘s death,
but born thereafter, there is no such consistency in the statutory treatment of a child
who was conceived after a parent‘s death.68 Twenty of the states with probate
statutes granting intestate inheritance rights to children born posthumously make no
mention of children who are conceived posthumously. 69 Three states—Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Indiana— incorporate into their statutes the 1946 Model Probate
Code‘s70 ―afterborn-heirs provision‖ which said that ―[d]escendants . . . of the
65. Id. at 962–63.
66. Id. at 963.
67. Id. at 958.
68. See generally Carpenter, supra note 6, at 362–83 (describing the statutes of each of the fortyeight jurisdictions which address the inheritance rights of children who are born posthumously, and
categorizing them based on their similarities and origins). As for the other three states, Carpenter notes
that ―the Mississippi and Nevada statutes do not address in any manner posthumous heirs—whether
conceived before or after the death of a parent.‖ Id. at 377 (citing MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 91-1-1 to 31
(West 2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 133–34 (2010)). New Hampshire‘s code also contains no
mention of posthumous heirs, but simply states that the ―surviving issue‖ of an intestate deceased can
inherit from the deceased‘s estate. Id. at 397 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561:1 (2007)).
69. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 362–66, 377, 390–91, 395; see ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.108
(LexisNexis 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2108 (West 2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210(a)
(LexisNexis 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-108 (LexisNexis 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-6
(LexisNexis 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.070 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A § 2108 (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 8 (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2108 (West
2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-118 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2308 (West 2012); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B:5-8 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-9 (LexisNexis 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2105.14 (LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.075 (2011); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2104(4) (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-108 (LexisNexis 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 303
(LexisNexis 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN., §§ 42-1-3f, 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2012); WISC. STAT. §§ 852.03,
854.21 (West 2012).
70. See infra Part II.E for a more detailed description of the Model Probate Code and other uniform
laws.
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intestate, begotten before his death but born thereafter, shall inherit as if they had
been born in [his] lifetime.‖ 71 The statutes of three states—Maine, Nebraska, and
Tennessee—provide that, ―[r]elatives of the decedent conceived before his death
but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in [his] lifetime,‖ reflecting an
early version of the Uniform Probate Code.72 Nine other states—Alaska, Arizona,
Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin—also use these, or very similar, words in their probate codes, but
replace ―conceived‖ with ―in gestation.‖ 73 With only slight variations in each, the
statutes of Kentucky, North Carolina, Oregon, Arkansas, and Massachusetts are
also worded similarly.74 Regardless of the specific words used, all twenty of these
states‘ statutes are at least somewhat ambiguous as to their practical effect on
posthumously conceived children. The confusion resulting from this ambiguity is
evidenced by the contradictory interpretations of the same language in the state
courts‘ decisions.75
The other twenty-seven states and D.C. explicitly address the rights of not
only posthumously born children, but also posthumously conceived children in
their statutes.76 Seven of those states—Virginia, Georgia, Idaho, Minnesota, South

71. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 362–64; see MODEL PROBATE CODE § 25 (1946); IND. CODE ANN. §
29-1-2-6 (LexisNexis 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (LexisNexis 2012); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2104(4) (West 2012).
72. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 364–65; see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A § 2-108 (West 2012);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2308 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-108 (LexisNexis 2012).
73. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 365–66; see ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.108 (LexisNexis 2012);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2108 (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-108 (LexisNexis 2012);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2108 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-118 (2011); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B:5-8 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 303 (LexisNexis 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN., §§
42-1-3f, 42-1-8 (LexisNexis 2012); WISC. STAT. §§ 852.03, 854.21 (West 2012).
74. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 377, 390–91, 395; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210(a) (LexisNexis
2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.070 (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 8 (2012)); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-9 (LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112.075 (2011).
75. See infra Part II.C.2.
76. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 367–83; see ALA. CODE § 26-17-707 (LexisNexis 2012); ALA. CODE
§43-8-47 (LexisNexis 2012); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 249.5-249.8 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15-11-120 (West 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45A-771 TO -779 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 310, 505 (LexisNexis 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (LexisNexis 2012); D.C. CODE § 19314 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)(1)
(LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-108 (LexisNexis 2012); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3
(West, 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (2005); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (West 2013); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis 2012);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-120(10) (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.050 (West 2013); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-11A-707 (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-108 (West 2012); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2(a)-(b) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-04-19 (LexisNexis 2011);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 228 (West 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-1-4 (LexisNexis 2012); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-108 (West 2012); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 160.707 (West 2012); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41(a) (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2104(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-707 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§
20-158.B, 20-164, (LexisNexis 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.730 (West 2013); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 2-4-103 (LexisNexis 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-907 (LexisNexis 2011).
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Carolina, South Dakota, and New York—expressly deny posthumously conceived
children the ability to inherit by intestate succession. 77 Another seven states—
Delaware, New Mexico, Texas, Alabama, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming—
declare that a child conceived after an individual‘s death using their genetic
material will be deemed the child of that individual if he or she consented to be the
child‘s parent, guided by the Uniform Parentage Act. 78 However, this grant of legal
status appears in the states‘ parentage laws, while their probate codes fail to address
posthumously conceived children, making their applicability to issues of intestate
succession unclear.79 Seven states expressly grant the legal status as a child of the
deceased individual to children conceived after the death of a parent, subject to
certain limitations.80 Florida‘s statute, the law interpreted to deny benefits to the
children in Capato, states that ―posthumously conceived children are eligible for a
‗claim against the decedent‘s estate,‘‖ only when such children are included in the
deceased‘s will.81 Mirroring the 2008 UPC, Colorado and North Dakota allow a
child conceived after a parent‘s death to inherit if the deceased intended to be
treated as the parent of the child, and the child is in utero within three years of their
death.82 Maryland, Louisiana, California, and Iowa have each enacted unique
statutes, which allow posthumously conceived children to inherit, subject to
different time, consent, and intent limitations.83 Lastly, the statutes of Connecticut,
Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and D.C. have language that
seems to grant inheritance rights to children conceived posthumously, without

77. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 367–68, 378–79; see GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (LexisNexis
2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-108 (LexisNexis 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-120(10) (West
2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-108 (West 2012); N.Y.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2(a)-(b) (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-158.B, 20-164,
(LexisNexis 2012).
78. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 368–72; see ALA. CODE § 26-17-707 (LexisNexis 2012); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (LexisNexis 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11A-707 (West 2012); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 160.707 (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-707 (LexisNexis 2012); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.26.730 (West 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-907 (LexisNexis 2011).
79. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 369–70; see ALA. CODE §43-8-47 (LexisNexis 2012); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 310, 505 (LexisNexis 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-108 (West 2012); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 41(a) (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-104(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2012); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 2-4-103 (LexisNexis 2011).
80. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 372–74; 379–83; see CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 249.5-249.8 (West
2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-120 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2013);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220A (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (West 2013); MD. CODE
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-04-19 (LexisNexis
2011).
81. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 379–80; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2013).
82. See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 372–74; see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-120 (West
2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-04-19 (LexisNexis 2011).
83. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 380–83; see CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 249.5-249.8 (West 2013); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 633.220A (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (West 2013); MD. CODE ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (LexisNexis 2012).
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limitation.84 However, when all of these laws were enacted, cryopreservation—the
technology responsible for the emergence of posthumously conceived children—
was not as widely used.85
2. State Court Decisions
In 2000, the New Jersey Superior Court addressed whether posthumously
conceived children could inherit from the estate of their deceased biological parent
under the state intestacy law in In re Estate of Kolacy,86 becoming the first court to
publish an opinion on the issue.87 The case arose when a mother sought a judicial
declaration from the state court that her twins, conceived using the sperm of her
husband a year after he died of cancer, were the legal heirs of the deceased. 88 The
Plaintiff‘s application for Social Security benefits on behalf of her children had
been denied, and she reasoned that such a declaration would increase her chances
of a successful federal administrative or judicial appeal.89 Both sides focused on the
New Jersey after-born heirs law, which stated that, ―[r]elatives of the decedent
conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the
lifetime of the decedent.‖90
The court rejected these arguments in favor of developing a new test, specific
to posthumously conceived children, reasoning that, ―[s]imple justice‖ required the
court to contemplate the rights of such children when announcing law affecting
those rights.91 The case presented an immediate real world problem in need of a
solution that was too urgent to wait for the legislature to respond. 92 Accordingly,
the court looked for direction in the state‘s intestacy statutes, and identified ―a basic
legislative intent to enable children to take property from their parents and through
their parents.‖93 Guided by this intent, the court held that once a child is proven to

84. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 376–77; see CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45A-771 TO -779 (West 2012);
D.C. CODE § 19-314 (West 2012); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3 (West, 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
59-501 (2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.050 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 228 (West 2013);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-1-4 (LexisNexis 2012). While the language of each state‘s statute is slightly
different, the thrust of all of these statutes is that a posthumous child shall inherit as if born during the
deceased intestate‘s lifetime. However, the laws do not distinguish between posthumously conceived
children and posthumously born children, which could indicate that the legislators only granted such
broad rights because they did not contemplate posthumously conceived children.
85. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 376.
86. 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (2000).
87. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 386.
88. Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1259.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1260 (quoting N.J.S.A. 3B: 5–8) (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id. at 1261–62.
92. Id. at 1261.
93. Id. at 1262.
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be a decedent‘s biological offspring, he or she is entitled to the legal status of an
heir.94
Like in New Jersey, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also opted to
develop its own new rule for determining the ability of posthumously conceived
children to inherit under state intestacy law in Woodward v. Commissioner.95 Upon
receiving an appeal from the Commissioner‘s denial of survivors‘ benefits to
Woodward, the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts certified to the state court the
question96 of whether two children, conceived using their father‘s sperm after his
death, could inherit as his natural children under Massachusetts law. 97 The state
court answered that posthumously conceived children could inherit if their genetic
relationship to the decedent was established and the decedent had consented to
posthumous reproduction and to supporting any children resulting therefrom. 98
In contrast, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied the status of a legal heir to a
posthumously conceived child in Finley v. Astrue.99 As in Woodward, the issue was
presented as a certified question from the federal court adjudicating a mother‘s
appeal of the denial of survivors‘ benefits to her child. 100 The child, unlike in earlier
cases, ―was created as an embryo through in vitro fertilization during his parents‘
marriage, but implanted into his mother‘s womb after the death of his father.‖ 101
The Court sought to effectuate the legislative intent behind the applicable statute,
which stated that ―[p]osthumous descendants of the intestate conceived before his
or her death but born thereafter shall inherit in the same manner as if born in the
lifetime of the intestate.‖102 While recognizing that the case turned on the definition
of conception, the court found it unnecessary to ascertain the word‘s meaning
because ―[the court could] definitively say that the General Assembly . . . did not
intend for the statute to permit a child, created through in vitro fertilization and
implanted after the father‘s death,‖ to inherit intestate. 103 The Court reasoned that
the legislature obviously did not intend to extend inheritance rights to
posthumously conceived children because the statute, enacted in 1969, did not

94. Id.
95. 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (2002).
96. As the state court explained, ―[t]he United States District Court judge certified the above
question to this court because [t]he parties agree that a determination of these children‘s rights under the
law of Massachusetts is dispositive of the case and . . . no directly applicable Massachusetts precedent
exists.‖ Id. at 261 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 259–61.
98. Id. at 259.
99. 270 S.W.3d 849, 850 (2008).
100. Id.
101. Id. Kolacy and Woodward both involved circumstances in which the father‘s sperm was frozen
prior to his death and used to fertilize the mother‘s eggs, forming embryos, after the father‘s death. In re
Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); Woodward v. Commissioner,
760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (2002).
102. Finley, 270 S.W.3d at 853 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210(a) (2004)).
103. Id.
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explicitly address such children. 104 Thus, the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted a
statute, virtually identical to the law at issue in Kolacy, to have the exact opposite
effect as that found by the New Jersey Superior Court. 105 However, the Arkansas
court‘s reasoning that policy decisions are solely for the legislature to make was
consistent with the rationale on which the Supreme Court of New Hampshire relied
a year earlier to deny a posthumously conceived child intestate inheritance rights in
Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Commissioner.106
D. Equal Protection and Nonmarital Children
The Fourteenth Amendment‘s Equal Protection Clause provides that ―no state
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.‖107 In Tigner v. Texas, the Supreme Court interpreted this language to mean
that states may classify people into groups to which disparate legal treatment
applies when the classification correlates to an actual difference between the
groups.108 Laws that discriminate against certain groups of people are, therefore,
not per se unconstitutional, but the discriminatory classification must be ―rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.‖109 Although the Fourteenth Amendment only
applies to states, in Bolling v. Sharpe the Court held that the federal government is
also subject to these limitations by the Fifth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause‘s
implicit Equal Protection component.110
The Supreme Court has since identified certain classifications for which the
Constitution requires a more significant reason to justify unequal treatment because
these classifications are inherently more suspect than others.111 The Court found
illegitimacy classifications to merit the use of heightened scrutiny in judicial review
in Clark v. Jeter.112 Declaring a Pennsylvania law that required nonmarital children
to establish paternity within six years of birth in order to receive support from their
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 90 and 102 and accompanying text.
106. 930 A.2d 1180, 1182, 1186 (2007). Khabbaz involved the application of statutory language that
was much more ambiguous that that considered in Finley. Id. at 1183. As such, the decision is not as
problematic as that of the New Jersey court because it does not seem to make the same unreasoned leaps
in logic to reach its conclusion.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
108. 310 U.S. 141, 146–47 (1940).
109. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). This standard is known as ―rational basis
review,‖ and is the least stringent level of review that the Court uses to evaluate laws challenged on
Equal Protection grounds. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 694 (4th ed. 2011).
110. 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954).
111. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (race); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (gender); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage).
112. 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). The use of intermediate scrutiny in reviewing discriminatory
classifications of nonmarital children is appropriate because, while such children possess many of the
same characteristics as other groups which receive heightened scrutiny, the discrimination against
nonmarital children has not been as severe as that experienced by racial or ethnic minorities, for whom
strict scrutiny is applied. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 797–98.
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fathers unconstitutional, the Court made clear that intermediate scrutiny applies to
legal distinctions based on legitimacy. 113 Accordingly, a law that treats marital and
nonmarital children differently is only constitutional if it ―serve[s] important
governmental objectives and . . . [is] substantially related to those objectives.‖114
From the plethora of cases in which the Supreme Court has reviewed
discriminatory classifications of illegitimate children, three trends have emerged.
First, laws that grant benefits to all legitimate children, but conclusively deny them
to illegitimate children, are always unconstitutional. 115 Second, laws that grant
benefits only to some illegitimate children are reviewed individually using
intermediate scrutiny.116 Lastly, statutes limiting the length of time for establishing
paternity are only constitutional when they provide sufficient time for relevant
parties to make their claims and are substantially related to the state‘s interest in
thwarting fraudulent claims.117 While the Social Security Act and relevant state
intestacy laws fall into the second category, many principles guiding the Supreme
Court‘s jurisprudence on legitimacy classifications were developed in the cases on
the first category of laws. 118 In Levy v. Louisiana, the Court invalidated a wrongful
death statute precluding nonmarital children from suing for their mother‘s death,
reasoning that ―it is invidious to discriminate against [illegitimate children] when
no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was
done.‖119 While acknowledging the state‘s interest in preventing fraudulent claims
to benefits in Trimble v. Gordon, the Court held such an interest was insufficient to
justify a total denial of benefits to all nonmarital children.120
Two of the most influential cases evaluating laws in the second category
involved challenges to the very statutory scheme at issue in Capato. In Jiminez v.
Weinberger, the Court invalidated the law‘s limitation of an illegitimate child‘s
eligibility for disability benefits based on the criteria in Section 416(h) because
marital children were automatically deemed dependent, while nonmarital children
who could not inherit intestate were deprived of even the opportunity to establish
dependency.121 The Court concluded that the Act‘s qualification mechanisms were
not sufficiently related to the government‘s interest in providing benefits solely to

113. Jeter, 486 U.S. at 461.
114. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). As the Supreme Court explained in United States v.
Virginia, ―the burden of justification is demanding and . . . rests entirely on the state,‖ under
intermediate scrutiny. 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
115. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 798.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 798–99 (describing the doctrines that were established in the earliest Supreme Court
cases applying intermediate scrutiny to laws that disadvantaged nonmarital children).
119. 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
120. 430 U.S. 762, 770–71 (1977).
121. 417 U.S. 628, 635–36 (1974).
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those in need after a parent became disabled.122 Just two years later, though, the
Court upheld the same statutory scheme, as it applied to Social Security survivors‘
benefits, in Mathews v. Lucas.123 The Court noted, just as it had when applying the
Act to disability benefits in Jiminez, that the Act automatically deemed marital
children, and nonmarital children who could inherit intestate, dependent; however,
in the context of survivors‘ benefits, all other nonmarital children had the
opportunity (or the burden) to prove that the insured was living with or contributing
to their support at the time of their death.124 The Court rejected the argument that
―the statute‘s matrix of classifications [bore] no adequate relationship to actual
dependency at death,‖ finding instead that the classification was ―reasonably
related to the likelihood of dependency at death,‖ and the administrative
convenience it provided was sufficient to justify any possible discriminatory
effect.125
E. Model Laws Serve as Recommended Statutory Schemes for the Appropriate
Legal Treatment of Posthumous Children
As noted above, many states have incorporated provisions from model codes
and uniform acts on posthumous children into their statutes. 126 The most significant
model laws include the Uniform Probate Code (based in large part on its
predecessor, the Model Probate Code), the Uniform Parentage Act, and the
American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology.127
1. The Uniform Probate Code
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) is maintained by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), and approved by the
American Bar Association (ABA). 128 Approximately one in four states today
employ the approaches embodied in the 1969 and 1990 versions of the UPC for the
legal treatment of posthumous children. 129 The 1969 UPC stated that ―[r]elatives of

122. Id.
123. 427 U.S. 495, 508–09 (1976).
124. Id. at 497–99.
125. Id. at 508–09.
126. See supra text accompanying note 70–71.
127. See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 362–75 (describing the model codes and uniform acts that have
been adopted by various states or are noteworthy for other reasons).
128. See Legislative Fact Sheet – Probate Code (2013), NAT‘L CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
ST. LAWS, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Probate%20Code (last visited June
14, 2013).
129. See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 364–66 (noting that Maine, Nebraska, and Tennessee retain the
language of the 1969 UPC in their statutes, while Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, New
Jersey, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin statutes continue to incorporate the words of the 1990
UPC).
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the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had
been born in the lifetime of the decedent.‖130 The 1990 UPC replaced this language
with ―[a]n individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that time
if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth.‖ 131 The Commissioners did not
comment on the purpose of the change, but it is certainly possible that they were
aware of the possibility of posthumous conception that had emerged by that time
due to technological developments.132 For the first time, the UPC expressly
addressed children conceived after a parent‘s death in its 2008 amendments,
specifically providing for intestate succession to a posthumously conceived child
when the decedent intended to be treated as the parent, and the child is in utero
within thirty-six months of the parent‘s death. 133 Although it has only been adopted
by two states,134 the 2008 UPC could be an ideal solution to the disparate legal
treatment of posthumously conceived children, in part because in its entirety, it
serves as a comprehensive statutory system for a field of law, avoiding the
possibility of conflicting provisions that can arise when laws are enacted in a
piecemeal fashion.135
2. The Uniform Parentage Act and the ABA Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology
The NCCUSL first recognized the rights of posthumously conceived children
in the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) in 2000, and amended the Act two years
later.136 The UPA states that if an individual has consented to being a parent
through assisted reproductive technology, but ―dies before placement of eggs,
sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child
unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were
to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the child.‖ 137
130. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1969).
131. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1990); see Carpenter, supra note 6, at 365 (describing the
historical evolution of the Uniform Probate Code).
132. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 365.
133. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-116 and 2-120 (2008). See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 372–73.
134. See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 374.
135. UNIF. PROBATE CODE (2008). The UPC is self-described as ―[a]n Act . . . making uniform the
law with respect to decedents and certain others; and repealing inconsistent legislation.‖ The
―underlying purposes and policies,‖ of the code include ―simplify[ing] and clarify[ing] the law
concerning the affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors and incapacitated
persons.‖ UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b). While the most recent version of the UPC was published in
2010, there were no major revisions made at that time, and the current version is commonly referred to
as the 2008 Uniform Probate Code.
136. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2002).
137. Id.; Although Section 707 might appear to affect children of married parents and children of
non-married parents differently by reference to the ―deceased spouse,‖ the prefatory note makes clear
that the authors of the 2002 UPA actually intended to erase any potential inequality that could have been
interpreted in its earlier form. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note at 1–2 (2002). In 2000, the
section stated that ―[i]f a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased spouse
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While significant for its early recognition of a relationship between posthumously
conceived children and their deceased parents, the UPA never explicitly addresses
the effect that this relationship should have on the children‘s rights to inherit, 138 but
states that it ―applies for all purposes.‖139 Without such an express directive, a court
interpreting the UPA could reasonably decide the issue in various ways—that the
Act applies to the probate context and the existence of a parent-child relationship
confers to the posthumous child inheritance rights, that the Act applies, but the
parent-child relationship does not necessarily implicate such rights, or that the Act
only applies to parentage, which only involves the rights and responsibilities of the
parent and child while the parent is alive.140 The ABA Model Act, adopted six
years after the UPA Amendments, incorporated, verbatim, 2002 UPA § 707.141
III. THE COURT‘S REASONING
In Astrue v. Capato, the Supreme Court unanimously embraced the Social
Security Administration‘s argument that a posthumously conceived child is entitled
to receive survivors‘ benefits only when the child qualifies to inherit from the
deceased parent under the intestacy laws of the state in which the decedent was
―domiciled‖ at death, or ―satisf[ies] one of the statutory alternatives 142 to that
requirement.‖143 The Court‘s analysis was based almost entirely on the principles of
statutory interpretation.144 When interpreting a statute, federal courts look first to
the plain language of the statute, the meaning of the language within the context of
surrounding provisions and the purpose of the statutory scheme as a whole, and
then to relevant legislative history, to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
legislature.145 The Court found that the text of the Act supports the determination
that rights to survivors‘ benefits for posthumously conceived children is contingent

is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse consented . . . that if assisted
reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the child.‖ UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2000). The substitution of ―individual‖ for all but one use of ―spouse‖ reflects
the UPA drafters‘ intent to give the same rights to all posthumously conceived children, whether or not
their parents are married. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note at 2 (2002).
138. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 369.
139. See Mary F. Radford, Postmortem Sperm Retrieval and the Social Security Administration:
How Modern Reproductive Technology Makes Strange Bedfellows, 2 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J.
33, 39 (2009) (quoting § 203 of the Uniform Parentage Act).
140. Carpenter, supra note 6, at 369–70.
141. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 607 (2008).
142. The ―statutory alternatives‖ to which the Court refers are the additional methods, listed in 42
U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(b) and (h)(3), for qualifying as a ―child‖ in order to be eligible to receive survivors‘
benefits. See supra text accompanying notes 36–37.
143. 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012).
144. See id. at 2025–26.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Davidson, 246 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United
States v. Choice, 201 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 2000) (―The language of the statute is the starting point for
interpretation . . . . we may look to the legislative history of a statute if the statutory language is
unclear.‖) (citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Cullen, 499 F.3d 157, 163 (2nd Cir. 2007).
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on their qualification for inheritance under applicable state law. 146 The provision at
issue, Section 416(e)(1), does not unambiguously define the word ―child,‖ but
Section 416(h), which, by its own terms, applies to Section 416(e), states that the
Commissioner should determine whether an applicant meets the definition of a
―child‖ by using the appropriate state‘s law on intestacy. 147
The Court also discredited Karen Capato‘s argument, which the Third Circuit
had embraced in its holding, reasoning that it contained several ―conspicuous
flaws.‖148 Capato contended that an applicant for survivors‘ benefits who is the
―biological child of a married couple,‖ clearly qualifies as a child under Section
416(e), which defines the term as the ―child of an [insured] individual.‖ 149 Such an
applicant is, therefore, not subject to Section 416(h) criteria.150 The Court gave
many reasons for rejecting Capato‘s interpretation. First noting that ―[n]othing in §
416(e)‘s tautological definition . . . suggests that Congress understood the word
‗child‘ to refer only to the children of married parents,‖ the Court reasoned that
such a confined reading would conflict with the common understanding of the
word, as reflected in multiple dictionaries. 151 Second, Congress did limit the
definition of ―child‖ to refer only to a legitimate child in another Social Security
Act provision152 and other ―contemporaneous statutes‖—evidence that Congress
purposefully chose the particular definition employed in the survivors‘ benefits
provisions.153 Third, Congress could have not have specifically ―intended
‗biological‘ parentage to be a prerequisite to ‗child‘ status‖ under Section 416(e),
because it was not possible to prove a biological connection between a parent and
child when the provision was passed in 1939.154 Fourth, the current legal reality is
that one‘s biological parent is not necessarily one‘s parent, under the law. 155 Lastly,
the Court pointed out ―that marriage does not ever and always make the parentage
of a child certain, nor does the absence of marriage necessarily mean that a child‘s

146. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027–28.
147. Id. at 2030–31. As the Court noted, § 416(h)(2)(A) of the Act states that ―[i]n determining
whether an applicant is the child or parent of [an] insured individual for the purposes of this subchapter,
the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply state intestacy law.‖ Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The subchapter referenced—Chapter 7, Subchapter II—encompasses both § 402(d), which
provides survivors‘ benefits to children, and § 416(e), which initially defines ―child.‖ Id. at 2031.
148. Id. at 2029–30.
149. Id. at 2029.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2029–30. The other Social Security Act provision to which the Court referred to was §
402(d)(3), which prescribes the criteria for the dependency under the Act, and thus, also pertains to the
determination of an applicant‘s eligibility for benefits.
153. Id. at 2030 (citing the Servicemen‘s Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, ch. 443, § 120 as an
example).
154. Id. at 2030.
155. Id. at 2030.
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parentage is uncertain.‖156 The latter is particularly true for posthumously
conceived children because, depending on the applicable state law, marriage may
end with the death of a spouse.157
After addressing Capato‘s argument, the Supreme Court went on to explain
how the Social Security Administration‘s interpretation of the Act serves the
central purpose that Congress sought to achieve by providing survivors‘ benefits,
while still precluding the burdens associated with administering those benefits from
becoming manageable.158 The Court elaborated that Congress created survivors‘
benefits primarily to replace the financial support lost by the dependent family
members when an insured individual dies. 159 Relying on the reasoning in Mathews,
the Court explained that when state law would allow a child to inherit from their
parent, it is reasonable to find that the child was more likely to have been
dependent on that parent at the time of death and as a result, ―[r]eliance on state
intestacy law to determine who is a ‗child‘ thus serves the Act‘s driving
objective.‖160 While recognizing that deferral to state law allows some people to
receive benefits who were not actually dependent, the Court concluded that
Congress may legislate ―for the generality of cases,‖ which it did ―here by
employing eligibility to inherit under state intestacy law as a workable substitute
for burdensome case-by-case determinations whether the child was, in fact,
dependent on her father‘s earnings.‖ 161
Finally, the Court rejected Capato‘s argument that the interpretation it
ultimately adopted denies equal protection to posthumously conceived children. 162
Capato had argued that under this interpretation, ―posthumously conceived children
are treated as an inferior subset of natural children who are ineligible for
government benefits simply because of their date of birth and method of
conception.‖163 The Court dismissed the notion that this violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it reasoned that ―[n]o showing has been made that
posthumously conceived children share the characteristics that prompted our
skepticism of classifications disadvantaging children of unwed parents.‖ 164

156. Id. (explaining that an adopted child does not typically have a legal relationship with their
genetic parents, nor do children conceived through assisted reproductive technology using donated
genetic material).
157. Id. The Court stated that ―it [was] far from obvious,‖ that the Capato twins would be considered
the biological children of married parents because Florida law holds that marriage ends when either
spouse dies. Id. (citing Price v. Price, 153 So. 904, 905 (1934)).
158. Id. at 2032.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2032–33.
163. Id. at 2033.
164. Id.
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Therefore, the Court concluded that rational-basis review was appropriate and, as a
result, ―the regime Congress adopted easily passes inspection.‖ 165
IV. ANALYSIS
The plain language of the Social Security Act‘s survivors‘ benefits provisions,
evidence of the legislative intent underlying those provisions, and the purpose of
the Social Security Act as a whole, generally lend credence to the Supreme Court‘s
conclusion in Capato.166 Taken together, these considerations do provide
significant support for the Court‘s holding. But they are not substantial enough to
overcome the Act‘s Equal Protection violation, a problem to which the Court gave
inadequate consideration, in order to reach its ultimate conclusion.167
A. Capato Poses Serious Problems for Equal Protection
The Court‘s holding that Section ―416(h) governs the meaning of ‗child‘,‖
and is, therefore, ―a gateway though which all applicants for insurance benefits . . .
must pass,‖ is somewhat misleading because the interpretation implies that the
survivors‘ benefits qualifying provisions impose no additional burdens on
illegitimate children.168 But even if Section 416(h) applies equally to all children,
its implementation may still result in unconstitutional legal treatment of illegitimate
children because Section 416(h) requires the reference to and application of state
laws, which themselves frequently contain provisions that discriminate based on
legitimacy.169
1. The Court Incorrectly Employed Rational Basis Review Instead of
Intermediate Scrutiny
When government action is challenged on Equal Protection grounds, the
proper level of scrutiny to be applied in the review thereof depends on the type of
discrimination embodied in the law and the type of rights affected by the law. 170
Rational-basis review is the ―default‖ standard,171 appropriate for evaluating all

165. Id.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 146–61.
167. See infra text accompanying notes 179–83; see also infra Part IV.A.2.
168. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2029 (suggesting that the provisions could not impermissibly
discriminate because all natural children must meet the same requirements under § 416(h)).
169. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-120 (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-0419 (LexisNexis 2011) (where state probate statute allows inheritance by posthumously conceived
children if (1) the deceased parent intended to be treated as a parent and (2) the child is in utero within
three years, children whose parents were married at the time of the deceased parent‘s death are
presumed to meet the first requirement, while children of non-married parents must produce clear and
convincing evidence of that intent).
170. CHEMERINSKY supra note 109, at 687.
171. Id. at 688.
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laws that do not impinge on fundamental rights 172 or employ a suspect
classification as the basis for distinguishing among people.173 Under this minimally
exacting level of review, a discriminatory classification is constitutional as long as
it is ―rationally related to a legitimate state interest.‖ 174 On the other end of the
spectrum, laws that discriminate based on race or national origin are subject to
strict scrutiny, and will only be upheld if ―suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.‖175 Falling somewhere between rational-basis review and strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny requires that a law ―serve[s] important governmental
objectives and . . . [is] substantially related to achievement of those objectives,‖ in
order to comply with Equal Protection.176 In Clark v. Jeter the Supreme Court left
no doubt that intermediate scrutiny should be used to review laws that distinguish
among people on the basis of legitimacy. 177
In Capato, the Court avoided giving meaningful consideration to the Equal
Protection problem presented by the Social Security Act‘s survivors‘ benefits
provisions because it found that posthumously conceived children do not possess
the characteristics that warranted the application of heightened scrutiny to
illegitimate children.178 This conclusion conflicts with the Court‘s evaluation of the
exact same statutory scheme using heightened scrutiny in Mathews v. Lucas, where
the Court‘s opinion focused heavily on whether the law‘s disparate impact on
certain illegitimate children was permissible. 179 This rationale also contradicts the
Capato Court‘s own statement that, depending on the applicable state law,
posthumously conceived children are inherently illegitimate children because
marriage ends with the death of a spouse. 180 Because many state intestacy statutes
contain provisions that disadvantage illegitimate children, 181 the recognition that
state law may conclusively deem posthumously conceived children as illegitimate
should have prompted the Court to acknowledge the possibility that the Social

172. The Supreme Court has held that certain rights are ―fundamental,‖ and when the government
infringes on those rights, strict scrutiny should be applied to evaluate the constitutionality of the
government action. Id. at 691. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378–79 (1971) (holding that
access to effective use of judicial process is a fundamental right); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554–
55 (1964) (holding that voting is a fundamental right); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–30
(1969) (holding that the right to interstate travel is fundamental).
173. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
175. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
176. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
177. 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
178. 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012).
179. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) (applying heightened scrutiny and concluding
that the statutory classifications were permissible, even though they had a discriminatory impact on
certain illegitimate children, because they were ―consistent with a design to qualify entitlement to
benefits upon a child‘s dependency‖).
180. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 169.
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Security Act impermissibly discriminates against posthumously conceived children
through its reliance on discriminatory state intestacy laws.182
Apparently disregarding its own inconsistent reasoning, the Court applied
rational-basis review, concluding that the statutory scheme easily met this standard
because it is ―reasonably related to the government‘s twin interests in [reserving]
benefits [for] those children who have lost a parent‘s support, and in using
reasonable presumptions to minimize the administrative burden of proving
dependency on a case-by-case basis.‖183 While the Court was justified in finding
that the Act‘s provision of survivors‘ benefits meets rational-basis review, such a
deferential standard was not appropriate for evaluating a law that allows for
differential treatment of children based on the marital status of their parents. 184
Instead, the Court should have followed its own well-established precedent, and
applied intermediate scrutiny.185 Doing so would have allowed the Court to correct
its misapplication of that precedent in Mathews v. Lucas, when it upheld the
statutory scheme because of the administrative convenience it provided, despite
acknowledging its discriminatory impact on illegitimate children and overinclusiveness.186
2. Under Proper Application of Intermediate Scrutiny, the Social Security
Act’s Survivors’ Benefits Provisions Are Unconstitutional
As discussed above, ―[t]o withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory
classification must be substantially related to an important governmental
objective.‖187 Applied to this case, the distinction between nonmarital children is
only constitutional if the Act involves an important government interest, and the
distinction is substantially related to serving that interest.188 Neither of the
government interests asserted—―[reserving] benefits [for] those children who have

182. An acknowledgement of such a possibility, and consequently the application of intermediate
scrutiny, would only have been consistent with the Supreme Court case law evaluating the
constitutionality of state laws that discriminate on the basis of legitimacy. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486
U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,
770–71 (1977).
183. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033 (quoting Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
184. See supra notes 107–14 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 112–22 and accompanying text.
186. 427 U.S. 495, 508–09 (1976). As Justice Stevens aptly stated in his dissent, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, ―[t]he Court‘s reason for approving discrimination against this class—
‗administrative convenience‘—is opaque and insufficient: opaque because the difference between this
justification and the argument rejected in Jimenez v. Weinberger is so difficult to discern; insufficient
because it unfairly evaluates the competing interests at stake.‖ Id. at 516–17 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974)).
187. Jeter, 486 U.S. at 461.
188. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 799.
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lost a parent‘s support‖ or administrative convenience189—meets both the
―important‖ and ―substantially related‖ prongs of the intermediate scrutiny test.
This Article will discuss the shortcoming of each interest asserted separately.
While it is safe to assume that providing benefits only to actual dependents is
an important government objective, 190 the criteria that serve to create a presumption
of dependency in the Act‘s survivors‘ benefits previsions are not substantially
related to that objective.191 Although there is no precise formula for determining
whether the mechanisms used in a law are sufficiently related to achieving the
law‘s goal, the Supreme Court has concentrated its evaluation of the relationship on
the extent to which the law‘s application is over-inclusive or under-inclusive.192
The benefits provisions are both over-inclusive, allowing children who are not
actually dependent to receive benefits because they were born to married parents
and thus, ―deemed dependent,‖193 and under-inclusive, denying benefits to children
who were dependent in reality, like those at issue in Mathews.194 In that case, the
provisions had the practical effect of denying benefits to applicants whose father
had consistently acknowledged them as his children throughout his life, and even
lived with them for many years, but who did not fit the criteria for dependency
listed in the Act.195
Conversely, it is easy to find that a substantial relationship exists between the
Act‘s dependency presumptions and the government‘s interest in administrative
convenience.196 But reducing administrative procedural burdens is not so important

189. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012).
190. This assumption is consistent with Supreme Court case law applying intermediate scrutiny to
evaluate laws challenged as violating Equal Protection. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628,
636 (1974) (―We recognize that the prevention of spurious claims is a legitimate governmental interest
and that dependency of illegitimate [like appellants] . . . has not been legally established even though, as
here, paternity has been acknowledged.‖); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 78, 85–86 (1979)
(accepting that supplying ―aid for children deprived of basic sustenance because of a parent‘s
unemployment‖ was an important government objective, the Court nonetheless declared a Social
Security Act provision granting benefits to children only when their father was unemployed, but did not
do so when their mother was unemployed, reasoning that the gender distinction in the provision was not
substantially related to serving that objective).
191. As the dissent in Mathews emphasized, the Act‘s criteria for deeming a child dependent are
based on questionable inferences, such as that legitimate children are much more likely to be dependent
on their parents than are illegitimate children, and ―nebulous inference upon inference is treated as more
acceptable evidence of actual dependency than proof of actual support for many years.‖ 427 U.S. at
521–22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 689.
193. Even the Court in Capato conceded that ―the intestacy criterion yields benefits to some children
outside the Act‘s central concern,‖ and that, under the Social Security Act‘s provisions, a child ―may be
eligible for benefits even though she never actually received her father‘s support.‖ 132 S. Ct. at 2032.
194. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 521–22 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2032 (explaining that the Act‘s dependency presumptions increase
administrative convenience by providing ―workable substitute[s] for burdensome case-by-case
determinations whether the child was, in fact, dependent on her father's earnings‖).
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an interest as to sustain the discrimination attached to it. 197 The traditional
skepticism with which the Court has viewed laws discriminating against nonmarital
children ―demands a conclusion that the classification is invalid unless it is justified
by a weightier governmental interest than merely ‗administrative convenience.‘‖ 198
The Social Security Act‘s survivors‘ benefits qualification scheme, through
the state statutes it implicates, is littered with provisions that advantage children
born to married parents. 199 By giving effect to these provisions, Capato continues
to put the Supreme Court‘s stamp of approval on the Equal Protection violation
first endorsed in Mathews.200
B. Capato Also Fails to Provide Any Uniformity in Legal Treatment of
Posthumous Children
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Capato is inadequate, not solely because it
conflicts with the Court‘s own Equal Protection precedent, but also because it
promotes continued unpredictability in the legal treatment of posthumously
conceived children.201 Although posthumous conception has existed for decades
and the number of children born as a result is substantial, 202 most states have not
explicitly addressed posthumously conceived children in their intestacy statutes.203
Instead, many states rely on statutes that grant, deny, or limit the ability to inherit
intestate to children who were ―conceived‖ or ―begotten‖ before the deceased
parent‘s death, or they assume that, because posthumously conceived children were
not contemplated by the legislators who wrote the applicable statute, such children
197. In striking down a Social Security Act survivors‘ benefits provision, which required proof of
dependency for male widows, but presumed dependency for all female widowers, the Supreme Court
recognized that Congress‘s enactment of ―provisions that draw lines in classifying those who are to
receive benefits . . . are entitled to deference as those of the institution charged under our scheme of
government with . . . making such judgments in light of competing policies and interests.‖ Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210 (1977). However, such classifications ―must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives‖ to be deemed
constitutional. Id. at 210–11 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Finding that ―[t]he only conceivable justification for . . . the presumption of wives‘
dependency . . . [was] based simply on archaic and overbroad generalizations that it would save the
Government time, money, and effort simply to pay benefits to all widows, rather than to require proof of
dependency of both sexes,‖ it held that ―such assumptions do not suffice to justify a gender-based
discrimination in the distribution of employment-related benefits.‖ Id. at 217 (quoting Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
198. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 519 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
200. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033 (holding that the Social Security Act‘s dependency
presumptions are constitutional, despite previously acknowledging their potentially discriminatory effect
on illegitimate children, in light of the administrative convenience that the presumptions allow).
201. See id. at 2031–32 (reviewing the wide variety of requirements that posthumously conceived
children must meet in order to inherit intestate, and in effect, qualify to receive Social Security Act
survivors‘ benefits, depending on the applicable state law).
202. See supra note 6.
203. See supra Part II.C.1.
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are never eligible inherit under them. 204 Furthermore, the practical effect that these
laws have when applied is subject to the whim of the interpreting courts because of
statutory ambiguity.205 Because these statutes were not written to account for
posthumously conceived children, their application can lead to unreasonable and
unpredictable legal treatment.206 A child conceived posthumously could inherit
intestate, and in turn qualify for survivors‘ benefits, in one state, while a child
conceived and born under the exact circumstances in a neighboring state would be
denied both.207
There are a wide variety of technologies that can now be used alone or
combined in a seemingly endless number of ways in order to create a child.
According to Section 102 of the ABA Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology, ―assisted reproduction means a method of causing pregnancy through
means other than by sexual intercourse,‖ which includes ―[i]ntrauterine
insemination,‖ ―[d]onation of eggs,‖ ―[d]onation of embryos,‖ ―[i]n-vitro
fertilization and transfer of embryos,‖ and ―intracytoplasmic sperm injection.‖ 208
The simple fact is that Congress and most state legislatures have not addressed
posthumous children, no matter which method was used for their conception, in the
legislation bearing on the rights of these children, and the older laws do not fit
current realities; attempting to make them fit leads to unpredictability and
injustice.209 While the Social Security Act survivors‘ benefits qualifying provisions
may reflect Congress‘ valuation of administrative convenience over uniformity, the
Court cannot affirm such a legislative choice when it discriminates against
illegitimate children, and thus, violates the Equal Protection Clause.

204. See supra Part II.C.1.
205. See supra Part II.C.2.
206. A hypothetical example is illustrative. In Ohio, a child may inherit intestate if she was
―begotten‖ before the death of her parent. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (LexisNexis 2012).
According to this law, when a mother and father preserve an embryo created with their genetic material
for later use, and that embryo is implanted into the mother‘s uterus after the father‘s death, their child
was ―begotten‖ before the father‘s death. But if the couple preserved their genetic material separately
and the mother used it to create an embryo only after the father‘s death, their child would have been
―begotten‖ after the father‘s death. The result is an arbitrary determination of who qualifies to inherit
based on the method of assisted reproduction chosen by the parents. See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 364
(arguing that ―[i]t is extremely unlikely that the drafters intended to draw such an arbitrary line when
they approved the language . . . [m]ore likely, they simply had not considered the possibility of
posthumous conception, which remained a scientific impossibility at that time‖).
207. See supra Part II.C.
208. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(1) (2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
209. See supra Part II.C.1.
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C. A Possible Two-Part Solution: A Federal Standard for Determining
Qualification for Survivors’ Benefits and State Statutes Explicitly Addressing
Posthumous Children
In order to achieve adequate and fair legal treatment of posthumous children,
both federal and state legislators need to take action. Congress should amend the
Social Security Act to create a federal standard for determining who qualifies to
receive survivors‘ benefits that is more closely related to actual dependency, rather
than referring to state law to make the determination. Social Security benefits are
federal benefits, granted to people across the entire nation, and accordingly, their
needs to be uniformity in their administration. 210 The federal standard should also
be created with potential Equal Protection implications in mind, so that any
potential for differential treatment of illegitimate children plaguing the current Act
is eliminated.
While the federal government should assume control over the administration
of Social Security benefits, states should retain control over intestacy laws, as this
is a domain typically governed by the states. However, states should revise their
intestacy statutes to account for the realities presented by recent scientific
advancements, eliminating the need for judicial guesswork in the application of
older laws. The 2008 UPC provides an excellent example for these new state laws.
Not only does it represent a comprehensive system for probate law, but it would
also enable states to give effect to decedents‘ wishes that their children to inherit
from them, while still safeguarding against fraudulent claims and overly
burdensome estate administrations.211
V. CONCLUSION
In Capato, the Supreme Court attempted to force the application of the
outdated Social Security Act to fit the complex modern realities created by major
scientific advancements.212 The Court held that state intestacy laws should control
the determination of whether a posthumously conceived child qualifies for

210. As stated by the Supreme Court in Flemming v. Nestor, ―[t]he Social Security system may be
accurately described as a form of social insurance enacted pursuant to Congress‘ power to spend money
in aid of the general welfare, whereby persons gainfully employed, and those who employ them, are
taxed to permit the payment of benefits to the retired and disabled, and their dependents.‖ 363 U.S. 603,
609 (1960) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 627, 640 (1937) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because the program is sustained through taxes, uniformly assessed by the federal government on all
those who contribute to the American economy, the distribution of the program‘s benefits should not be
contingent on state law.
211. See Carpenter, supra note 6, at 372–74. However, the 2008 UPC is not perfect. It does contain
presumptions in favor of a finding a parent-child relationship for the purposes of intestate succession
that advantage legitimate children. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-116 and 2-120 (2008). Such
presumptions should be eliminated prior to being adopted by the state legislatures in order to avoid
violating the Equal Protection Clause.
212. See supra notes 1–3, 6 and accompanying text.
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survivors‘ benefits,213 ignoring the problems that their decision poses for Equal
Protection and for the disparate legal treatment of posthumously conceived
children.214 The Court overlooked internal inconsistencies in its reasoning and
conflicting precedent in order to reach its conclusion. 215 This undesirable method of
judicial interpretation should be a sign to federal and state legislators that judges
are being forced to make law by applying inapplicable statutes, and that the time
has come to for elected representatives to take responsibility for adequately
legislating on modern issues with such an important effect on a growing number of
posthumously conceived children.

213. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012).
214. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 178–82.

